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Abstract—A smart grid power system is capable of adjusting
the amount of electricity generated based on real-time requests
from the smart meters of customers, thus avoiding excess electric-
ity generation and facilitating reliable and effective transmission
of electricity. To ensure that requests are sent from a valid user,
all request messages must be authenticated. On the other hand,
by analyzing the electricity usage pattern of a customer, the
daily habit of the customer, such as when he is away, may be
revealed. Thus, a proper privacy preserving mechanism has to
be adopted. This paper attempts to develop a scheme to address
these two seemingly contradicting requirements efficiently. By
using a tamper-resistant device at the smart appliance and pseudo
identities, we derive a privacy preserving authentication scheme
to solve the problem. The authentication process is made very
efficient by means of Hash-based Message Authentication Code
(HMAC). Through simulation, we show that with our scheme, the
transmission and signature verification delay induced are very
small and the message overhead is only 20 bytes per request
message. With our efficient verification process, even under
attack, the substation can effectively drop all attack messages,
allowing 6 times more valid messages to reach the control center
when compared to the case without any verification. Thus our
scheme is both efficient and effective.
Index Terms—Smart grid network, authentication, privacy
preserving, pseudo identity, tamper-resistant device
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart grid is considered as the next generation power
supply network which facilitates reliable and effective trans-
mission of electricity from power generators to household
electric appliances. In this network, the amount of electricity
generated can be adjusted according to the real-time demand
of consumers. This not only ensures that consumer demands
are satisfied but also avoids excess electricity generation. The
latter can help increase the profit of the power operators and
protect the environment. In the future, a smart grid network
may also facilitate a consumer to sell unused electricity back
to the power operator.
As suggested by [1], a smart grid network is roughly divided
into three layers: (1) power operator; (2) substations; and (3)
smart meter (usually one per household) and smart appliances
of customers. Figure 1 shows a simplified architecture of a
smart grid network. Each customer premises is assumed to
have a smart meter installed. The smart appliances in the
household will communicate with the smart meter which will
then communicate with the substation via existing wireless
or wired networks (e.g. Internet through the routers in the
premises). The substations will collect real-time demand and
usage information from smart meters and forward the infor-
mation to the power generator systems for further analysis and
processing. The power generators and the substations commu-
nicate through the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system [2].
Fig. 1. Simplified Architecture of Smart Grid Network
Unlike the Kwh meters in the traditional power network,
the smart meters will push information of the appliances to the
substations periodically. In this paper, we focus on two major
security issues of the communication between the substations
and the smart meters.
Information flow from individual electric appliances to the
substations (and then to the power generators) has great impact
on the reliability of power supply and is related to the charges
for the customers. Security issues in a smart grid system must
not be overlooked. In particular, sender authentication and user
privacy preservation are two major concerns [3].
Since the information sent by individual appliances deter-
mines the amount of electricity a generator has to generate, a
proper authentication scheme should be imposed to ensure that
the identity of the sender can be confirmed. On the other hand,
unlike traditional Kwh meters which only record the cumula-
tive amount of electricity used, the smart meters transmit real-
time information of individual appliances to the substations.
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As a result, electricity usage patterns of the consumer will
easily be traced and leaked. Such privacy leakage can be used
to reveal the daily habits of the consumer such as when a
consumer is not at home. This privacy preservation issue has
been raised in [3], [4]. A proper privacy preserving mechanism
has to be adopted.
The design of security schemes in a smart grid system to
tackle the above issues is not trivial and subject to the follow-
ing challenges. First of all, most data communications in smart
grid network can be considered as critical. Any delay may
result in the consumer experiencing electricity interruption.
According to [5], the power generator system only has a few
seconds to receive data from substations in each period. Any
security schemes added to the system should be efficient in
terms of time complexity. On the other hand, while the identity
of a sender needs to be authenticated, we have to preserve the
privacy of the consumers, and we do not want a substation
to be able to analyze the exact amount of electricity needed
by each appliance. Thus, techniques to enable a substation to
process the information without knowing their actual contents,
and to prevent linking the information to the users are required.
In this paper, we utilize the hierarchical structure of a
smart grid and propose a novel tamper-resistant-device-based
Privacy-preserving Authentication Scheme for Smart grid net-
work (PASS). Recall that we only focus on the substation-to-
consumer subsystem. Our scheme has the following security
features:
1) Substations: which are physically more secure from being
attacked, are responsible for basic authentication of messages
sent by smart appliances on their way to the control center.
This can help to ensure the availability of the power system.
2) Household smart appliances: which are more vulnerable
to attacks, are made more secure by connecting them to
tamper-resistant devices. It is a general assumption that keys
stored on them are difficult to be cracked. In this paper,
since smart appliance and tamper-proof device actually refer
to the same electric device, we will use these two terms
interchangeably.
3) The real identity of any smart appliance and the amount
of electricity required by it from time to time can only be
known by the control center. We make this possible using the
concept of pseudo identity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work
is reviewed in Section II. The system model and the problem
statement are included in Section III. Some preliminaries are
given in Section IV. Our schemes are presented in Section
V. The analysis and evalution of our schemes are given in
Sections VI and VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The smart grid project was initiated by the European Union
in 2003 [6]. At around the same time, the IntelliGrid project
[7] was started by the Electric Power Research Institute of
the USA. The US DOE started the Grid 2030 project [8].
Under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is
responsible for coordinating the development of a framework
for information management to achieve interoperability of
smart grid devices. In 2010, NIST released a report [5] which
describes the potential components of a smart grid. Some
security issues (which they define as cyber security) are also
discussed.
A recent work [9] elaborates on the importance of a smart
grid especially with the consideration of renewable energy re-
sources. A new control model known as risk-limiting dispatch
is described. Some new requirements of the communication
architecture and potential security problems are identified.
As such, there is an urgent need to establish protocols and
standards for the smart grid.
In terms of security, the major issues are discussed in
details in [3] and [4]. For the generator-to-substation com-
munication, some security measures are already in place in
the extended version of SCADA [10]. For the substation-
to-appliance communication, sender authentication and user
privacy preservation are considered as the two major concerns
as discussed earlier. However, not much research has been
done in this aspect yet.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we discuss our assumptions and security
requirements in details.
A. System model and assumptions
Recall that we consider a smart grid network to consist
of three basic layers - power generators, substations, and
smart meters and smart appliances. It can be easily observed
that these three layers have different physical security level
assumptions.
1) The power generator system (or referred to as the control
center) is assumed to be secure and fully trusted.
2) Substations are usually physically locked from outside
access as it contains expensive electric devices such as trans-
formers. They are relatively more difficult to be compromised
by attackers. In this paper, we assume that they are secure.
3) Electric appliances (as well as smart meters) are more
vulnerable to physical disturbance and compromise since they
are located at customers’ homes and the power operator has
no way to keep an eye on them.
Also without loss of generality, we assume that servers at the
control center and the substations have higher computational
power.
B. Security requirements
We aim at designing an authentication scheme to validate
request messages from smart appliances which are located
at customers’ homes while at the same time, preserve the
customers’ privacy (such as daily electricity usage pattern).
The security requirements are summarized as follows:
1) Message authentication: The request message from any
electric appliance has to be properly authenticated before they
are forwarded to and processed by the control center. Also197
an attacker cannot impersonate any valid electric appliance to
send out fake request messages.
2) Identity privacy: The real identity of any electric appliance
should be kept anonymous from any third party to protect the
privacy of the customer concerned. In this way, a third party
should not be able to relate multiple messages sent by the
same electric appliance or even by the same customer.
3) Request message confidentiality: The amount of electricity
required by any electric appliance should be kept confidential
from any third party to protect the privacy of the customer
concerned. A third party should not be able to trace the daily
electricity usage pattern (and thus the daily habit) of any
customer by collecting electricity request messages from them.
4) Traceability: Though the real identity of and the amount
of electricity required by an electric appliance cannot be
revealed by a third party, the trusted control center should have
the ability to obtain any appliance’s real identity and their
electricity usage. This is necessary for the actual electricity
supply determination.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we explain the concepts of public-key
encryption, digital signature and hash-based message authen-
tication code.
A. Public-key encryption and digital signature
Public-key encryption is a function provided by the public
key infrastructure (PKI) and is also known as asymmetric
encryption. A trusted party assigns each user a pair of public
key and private key. The public key can be known by everyone
while the private key is kept secret. To securely send a
message, the sender encrypts the message using the receiver’s
public key. The receiver can then obtain the message by
decrypting using the corresponding private key. RSA [11] is a
well-known algorithm for public-key encryption. Throughout
this paper, we denote the process of encrypting plaintext
M with public key PK to obtain ciphertext C as C =
ENCPK(M). Similarly, we denote the process of decrypting
ciphertext C with private key SK to obtain plaintext M as
M = DECSK(C).
Public-key digital signature is another function provided by
the PKI and is a direct extension of public-key encryption.
Using the private key assigned by a trusted party, one can
generate a unique signature on a message. The receiver can
then use the sender’s public key to verify the validity of
the signature. RSA is a well-known algorithm for computing
digital signature. Throughout this paper, we denote the process
of signing message M with private key SK to obtain signature
σ as σ = SIGSK(M).
B. Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is a
specific construction for computing a message authentication
code (MAC) using a cryptographic hash function in combi-
nation with a secret key. Both data integrity and authenticity
of a message can be achieved using such a technique. Well-
known hash functions such as SHA-1 [12] and MD5 [13] can
be extended to produce an HMAC. Due to the property of
hash functions, an HMAC value can be computed in a much
shorter time than a traditional digital signature. Throughout
this paper, we denote the HMAC value generated on message
M using the secret key K as HMACK(M).
V. OUR SOLUTION - PASS
This section presents our Privacy-preserving Authentication
Scheme for Smart grid network (PASS) in details.
A. Preparation module
As discussed earlier, each smart appliance (located at cus-
tomers’ homes) is attached with a tamper-resistant device
for generating pseudo identities and signatures on messages
(details will be discussed in the next sub-section and these
are the only functions that can be carried out by the device).
The tamper-resistant device has a clock which runs on its own
battery. Clocks on tamper-resistant devices are assumed to be
roughly synchronized. A customer is given that device when
he/she opens an account or registers a newly purchased smart
appliance at the power operator.
The control center generates its public and private keys.
We denote Pubcc as its public key which is assumed to be
preloaded into all tamper-resistant devices. Pricc is its private
key (corresponding to Pubcc) and is kept private.
Assume that the region controlled by substation STr is
denoted by Rr. The control center first assigns STr an identity
SIDr. It then generates an initial system key sr and saves it
into all tamper-resistant devices located in regionRr as well as
the substation STr (for signature verification purpose; details
will be discussed in the next sub-section). The control center
stores < SIDr, sr > in its local database.
The control center assigns each smart appliance Ai a real
identity RIDi which is securely preloaded into its tamper-
resistant device. Besides, it also generates a pair of public
and private keys, Pubi and Prii respectively, and securely
preloads them into the tamper-resistant device. The term
”securely” means that RIDi cannot be known or modified
by an unauthorized party easily. The control center stores
< RIDi, Pubi > in its local database. Besides parameters,
the tamper-resistant device also has two (and only these two)
functions pre-loaded: 1) Generation of pseudo identity based
on the smart appliance’s real identity. The details will be
discussed in Section V-B. 2) Generation of HMAC value on a
given message using the regional system key. The details will
be discussed in Section V-C.
B. Pseudo identity generation module
Now assume that the smart appliance Ai wants to request
more electricity supply from the control center.
Ai’s tamper resistant device first generates a pseudo identity
PIDi as PIDi = ENCPubcc(RIDi||r) where || represents
a pre-defined form of concatenation and r is a per-session
random nonce. When we look closer, ENCPubcc(RIDi||r))198
actually represents encrypting the concatenation of RIDi
and r using the control center’s public key. Note that r is
necessary here so that two pseudo identities from the same
smart appliance cannot be linked up easily by an eavesdropper.
C. Signing module
Assume that the amount of electricity requested is de-
noted as Mi. Ai’s tamper-resistant device first extracts
the current timestamp Ti from its clock and gener-
ates its signature on the request message Mi as σi =
HMACsr (PIDi||ENCPubcc (Mi)||Ti). Recall that sr is the
regional system key.
Finally, Ai sends < PIDi, ENCPubcc(Mi), Ti, σi > to the
control center via the smart meter in the household and its
regional substation.
D. Verification module
Without loss of generality, we assume that the substation






, σi > from Ai, STr drops it
if the timestamp T ′i is outdated (say much longer than the
average transmission time concerned). This procedure can help
minimize the impact of replay attack.
If the timestamp is not outdated, the substation







) is equal to σi.
If not, the substation simply drops the message. If the
signature is valid, it forwards the message to the control
center.
The substation STr stores all pseudo identities, encrypted
request messages together with HMAC signatures locally so
that they can be transmitted to the control center in a batch
at a later time for investigation purpose when an attack takes
place.
E. Tracing module
Upon receiving the forwarded message from the substation
STr, the control center first reveals Ai’s real identity RIDi
based on its pseudo identity PIDi. This can be done by
decrypting ENCPubcc(RIDi||r)) using its private key Pricc
and then removing r from the end of the block (RIDi||r).
After that, the control center arranges to update the current
power supply rate to fulfill Ai’s requirement accordingly.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyse our scheme with respect to the security require-
ments listed in Section III.
1) Message authentication: Before a smart appliance trans-
mits a request message to the control center, it has to include
an HMAC signature on the message using the regional system
key. This regional system key is only known by the control
center, the substation and all tamper-resistant devices within
the region. Hence an outside attacker (who does not belong to
the region or is not a registered smart appliance) does not know
how to generate a valid HMAC signature. Thus our scheme is
protected from outsider attacks.
2) Identity privacy: In all request messages sent by a smart
appliance, pseudo identities instead of real identity is used.
The pseudo identity PIDi of smart appliance Ai is defined as
ENCPubcc(RIDi||r) where r is a per-session random nonce.
Since RIDi is encrypted using the public key of the control
center, no one except the control center can decrypt it. Also
with the per-session random nonce r, two pseudo identities
belonging to the same smart appliance cannot be related by
an eavesdropper easily.
3) Request message confidentiality: The amount of electricity
required by a smart appliance is encrypted using the public
key of the control center. Thus, except the control center, no
one can decrypt to obtain the amount. On the other hand,
the homomorphic encryption feature in our scheme allows
a substation to aggregate request messages sent by smart
appliances within its region but the substation does not need
to know about those individual amount values.
4) Traceability: As shown in Section V-E, the control center
has the ability to reveal the real identity of any smart appliance
based on their pseudo identities.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate our PASS scheme by simulation. To the best of
our knowledge, our scheme is the first to address end-to-end
security issues in a smart grid network, so we compare the
performance with and without our PASS scheme. The results
show that when under attack, the PASS scheme can allow
much more normal request messages to arrive successfully at
the control center due to the effective filtering done by the
substation of the region where the attack is launched. The
delay induced by the PASS system is marginal.
A. Simulation models
Our simulation is based on NS-2 [14]. We consider a smart
grid network covering a small city. The smart grid network
has a hierarchical structure (see Figure 2 for a simplified
topology). At the highest level, there is a control center
maintained by the power operator (Node 12 in Figure 2). At
the middle level, there are substations with each of them being
responsible for one region (Nodes 9, 10 and 11 in Figure 2).
At the lowest level, there are smart appliances (Nodes 0 to 8
in Figure 2). Note that we ignore smart meters here since the
communication between smart appliances and smart meters is
not a focus of this paper. To simulate the nature of single
incoming interface for all substations and control center, we
connect a router node to each substation and control center for
accepting traffic from lower levels (Nodes 13 to 16 in Figure
2).
For all of our experiments, we assume that the city consists
of 10 regions (i.e. 10 substations) and the number of smart
appliances is evenly distributed into the 10 regions where the
number of smart appliances is a variable. Note that there may
be far more smart appliances in a region but we only consider
those which have power requests during the simulation period.
Each smart appliance is connected to the router node of
the substation in its region via a wired link with bandwidth199
Fig. 2. A Simplified Topology
10 Mb/s. For the smart appliances that issue attack packets
(attacking smart appliances), to ensure that all attacking traffic
can reach the substation, the bandwidth of the wired links
concerned is set to 10 Mb/s. Each substation is in turn
connected to the router node of the control center via a wired
link with bandwidth 10 Mb/s. The buffer size of each link is set
to 10 packets and Drop Tail mechanism is applied whenever
the buffer is full. For all power request messages, following
the DNP3 frame structure in SCADA [15], we assume that
the packet size is 250 bytes and with our PASS scheme, a
20-byte HMAC signature is added to each packet. All request
messages are transmitted at a rate of 1 Mb/s. Since power
request messages are assumed to be critical, UDP protocol is
used for the transmission layer. Also for our PASS scheme,
all HMAC signature verification is done at substations. From
our experiment on a conventional Pentium Dual Core desktop,
the time required for computing an HMAC signature is 368
msec.
We use the following three measures to evaluate the system.
1) Normal traffic success rate: which is defined as the
proportion of normal power request messages sent by non-
attacking smart appliances that can reach the control center
within the simulation period.
2) Average delay: which is defined as the average duration
from when a normal (non-attacking) smart appliance sends out
its power request message to when the control center receives
the message. Only requests that can reach the control center
successfully are considered.
3) Total amount of data: which is defined as the total number
of bytes of data being injected into the smart grid network for
all power requests (including those being dropped) to reflect
the amount of bandwidth wasted due to the attack. Attacking
traffic sent by attackers is not included.
We consider a number of scenarios and each scenario lasts
for 60 seconds (i.e. 1 minute) of NS time. We perform two sets
of experiments. In the first set of experiments, we assume that
there is no attacking traffic (i.e. no attacker) in the smart grid
network. Within the 60 seconds of simulation time, there are
random number of power request messages sent from smart
appliances. The exact time of power request message gener-
ation is randomly chosen. This simulates different levels of
traffic loading of the smart grid network. We then investigate
the delay induced by the system. Since there is no attack
packet, the total amount of data injected into the sytem is
the total amount of data for all the request messages. With
the PASS scheme, the overhead is only 20 bytes (for the
HMAC signature) which is only 8% more compared to the
case without the PASS scheme.
In the second set of experiments, we fix the number of
smart appliances to 1000 (i.e. keep an identical traffic loading)
and vary the number of attackers and the volume of attacking
traffic to investigate their impact on normal power request
messages sent by non-attacking smart appliances.
B. Simulation results and discussion
In the first set of experiments, we assume that there is no
attacker in the smart grid network. We vary the total number
of smart appliances from 500 to 5000 in steps of 500 to
simulate different levels of traffic loading of the network.
We then study the average delay experienced by each request
with and without PASS and the result is shown in Figure 3.
From the figure, we can see that the average delay (which
includes transmission delay, propagation delay and queuing
delay) slightly increases as the traffic loading of the network
increases. With the PASS scheme, an additional 0.05 msec is
required for the transmission due to the inclusion of 20 bytes
of HMAC signature for each power request message.
Fig. 3. Average Delay vs. Number of Smart Appliances
In the second set of experiments, we fix the number of smart
appliances to 1,000. We then vary the number of attackers from
0 to 20 in steps of 1 and each attacker sends out attacking
traffic at a transmission rate of 4 Mb/s (i.e. 4 times that of
normal traffic) throughout the whole simulation period. Also
we assume that all attackers concentrate in one region. For
each number of attackers, we study the normal traffic success
rate with and without PASS and the result is shown in Figure
4. From the figure, we can see that 3 attackers can already
saturate the network in our case. Without PASS, the overall
normal traffic success rate drops significantly from 100% to
15.3% as the number of attackers increases from 2 to 3. When
the number of attackers increases from 3 to 4, the rate further
drops slightly from 15.3% to 15.2%. However, with PASS,
the overall normal traffic success rate only drops a little bit
from 100% to 98.5% as the number of attackers increases from200
0 to 4. That is, our PASS scheme yields more than 6 times
improvement. The reason is that all attacking traffic are filtered
at the substation level and so they will not be forwarded to
the control center and affect other normal users.
On the other hand, for the attacking region (i.e., the region
with attackers) and the non-attacking regions (i.e., the regions
without attackers) separately, we find that without PASS, the
proportion of normal traffic from the attacking region that
can reach the control center is larger than that from the
non-attacking regions. This is because by default, the control
center router will schedule to transmit more packets from the
attacking region due to the long queue on the corresponding
incoming interface. With PASS, the normal traffic success rate
in the attacking region increases a bit from around 78% to
around 84% since attacking traffic will not compete for the
outgoing link towards the control center anymore. The normal
traffic success rate in the non-attacking region increases from
8.6% to 100% due to the attacking traffic filtering mechanism
at substations in our scheme.
Fig. 4. Normal Traffic Success Rate vs. Number of Attackers
Regarding the delay performance under attack, with or
without PASS, the overall average delay, the delay experienced
by requests from attacking and non-attacking regions are quite
close to each other. With PASS, each request experiences
an average delay of 409 msec. Without PASS, each request
experiences an average delay of 41 msec. That is, our PASS
scheme only requires an additional 368 msec for HMAC
signature verification at a substation.
From the above results, we can see that PASS yields
significant gain in overall normal traffic success rate when
under attack. The gain can be up to 6 times that without
PASS. Though our scheme induces a small additional trans-
mission delay (0.05 msec on average) and an HMAC signature
verification delay (368 msec), this additional delay should be
acceptable.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving authentica-
tion scheme for the smart grid network. By observing that
substations are usually physically harder to be compromised,
they are utilized to help authenticate messages sent by smart
appliances before these messages actually reach the control
center. We suggest to connect smart appliances to tamper-
resistant devices which are assumed to be secure from data
cracking or operation disturbance, which makes it feasible
for the substation to distinguish attack packets from normal
requests. A major feature of our scheme is that the privacy
of any customer including their daily electricity usage can
be preserved while at the same time the control center can
generate a proper amount of electricity.
Through our simulation study, we showed that with our
PASS scheme, the additional transmission delay induced is
0.05 msec on the average while the HMAC signature verifi-
cation delay induced is 368 msec only. On the other hand,
the message overhead is only 20 bytes per request message.
When under attack, our scheme yields a significant gain in
normal traffic success rate especially in non-attacking regions
and the gain can be up to more than 6 times. This shows the
effectiveness of our filtering mechanism at substations. In the
future, we will implement our scheme in a testbed. If we can
collect statistics on real power usage, we could perform a more
realistic simulation. There is one limitation in our scheme, the
success rate in the attacking region drops due to the time used
for the authentication of the attack packets. To tackle this issue,
one possible direction is to re-route some of the packets to the
nearby substations whenever the volume of requests exceeds
a certain threshold so that the workload can be shared by
other substations. Besides, we are considering other secure
applications in smart grid networks.
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